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ABSTRACT
The overturning of the Internet Privacy Rules by the Federal Com-
munications Commissions (FCC) in late March 2017 allows Internet
Service Providers (ISPs) to collect, share and sell their customers’
Web browsing data without their consent. With third-party trackers
embedded on Web pages, this new rule has put user privacy under
more risk. The need arises for users on their own to protect their
Web browsing history from any potential adversaries. Although
some available solutions such as Tor, VPN, and HTTPS can help
users conceal their online activities, their use can also significantly
hamper personalized online services, i.e., degraded utility. In this
paper, we design an effective Web browsing history anonymization
scheme, PBooster, aiming to protect users’ privacy while retain-
ing the utility of their Web browsing history. The proposed model
pollutes users’ Web browsing history by automatically inferring
how many and what links should be added to the history while
addressing the utility-privacy trade-off challenge. We conduct ex-
periments to validate the quality of the manipulated Web browsing
history and examine the robustness of the proposed approach for
user privacy protection.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and Privacy→ Data Anonymization and Sanitiza-
tion; • Security and privacy→ Privacy protections;
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1 INTRODUCTION
The web browsing history is the list of web pages a user has vis-
ited in past browsing sessions and includes the name of the web
pages as well as their corresponding URLs. Online users usually
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or
classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed
for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation
on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM
must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish,
to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a
fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org.
WSDM ’19, February 11–15, 2019, Melbourne, VIC, Australia
© 2019 Association for Computing Machinery.
ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-5940-5/19/02. . . $15.00
https://doi.org/10.1145/3289600.3291026
expect a secure environment when surfing the Web wherein their
personally identifiable information (a.k.a. PII) could be kept hidden
from prying eyes. However, the web browsing history log is stored
by the web browser on the device’s local hard drive. In addition to
the web browser, users’ browsing histories are recorded via third-
party trackers embedded on the web pages to help improve online
advertising and web surfing experience. Moreover, Internet Service
Providers (ISPs) such as AT&T and Verizon, have full access to
individuals’ web browsing histories. ISPs can infer different types
of personal information such as users’ political views, sexual ori-
entations and financial information based on the sites they visit.
Some countries have policies for protecting individuals’ privacy. For
example, European Union (EU) has regulated a new data protection
and privacy policy for all individuals within the European Union
and the European Economic Area (a.k.a. General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR)).1United States government also had Federal
Communications Commission’s (FCC) landmark Internet privacy
protections for users such that ISPs could have been punished by
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) for violating their customers’
privacy. However, not all countries have such policies. FCC’s Inter-
net privacy protection has been also removed in late March of 2017.
This new legislation allows ISPs to monitor, collect, share and sell
their customer’s behavior online such as detailed Web browsing
histories without their consent and any anonymization.2
Assuming that ISPs and online trackers make browsing history
data pseudonymous before sharing, a recent study has shown the
fingerprintability of such data by introducing an attack which maps
a given browsing history to a social media profile such as Twitter,
Facebook, or Reddit accounts [36]. Although linking browsing his-
tory to social media profiles may not always lead to figuring out
one’s real identity, it is a stepping stone for attackers to infer real
identities. This identity exposure may result in harms ranging from
persecution by governments to targeted frauds [6, 10].
The onus is now on the users to protect their browsing history
from any kind of adversaries like ISPs and online trackers. There
are approaches to help users shield their web browsing history
such as browser add-ons or extensions (e.g., ‘Ghostery’, ‘Privacy
Badger’ and ‘HTTPS everywhere’), Virtual Private Networks (VPN)
services, Tor, and HTTPS. However, none of the above solutions
can prevent ISPs from collecting users’ web browsing history and
protect users’ identities when such information is revealed because
de-anonymization attacks will still work [36]. Moreover, using these
solutions could result in a severe decrease in the quality of online
personalization services due to the lack of customer’s information.
This information is critical for online vendors to profile users’ pref-
erences from their online activities to predict their future needs. So
1https://bit.ly/1lmrNJz
2http://wapo.st/2mvYKGa
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users face a dilemma between user privacy and service satisfaction.
Hereafter, we refer to a user’s satisfaction of online personalization
services, as online service utility, or simply, utility. The aforemen-
tioned challenges highlight the need to have a web browsing history
anonymizer framework, which can help users strike a good balance
between their privacy and utility. Traditional privacy preserving
web search techniques such as [38, 40, 41] are designed for different
purposes and are thus ineffective in accomplishing our goals.
Intuitively, the more links we add to a web browsing history,
the more privacy we can preserve. An extreme case is when the
added links completely change a user’s browsing history to per-
fectly obfuscate the user’s fingerprints. Some existing methods
include ISPPolluter,3 Noiszy,4 and RuinMyHistory5 which pollute
a web browsing history by adding links randomly. However, such
methods largely disturb user profiles and thus results in the loss
of utility of online services. Similarly, the maximum service utility
can only be achieved at the complete sacrifice of user privacy. It
is challenging to design an effective browsing history anonymizer
that retains high utility. In this paper, we aim to study the following
problem: howmany links andwhat links should be added to a user’s
browsing history to boost user privacy while retaining high utility.
Note that links cannot be removed from the browsing history as all
of user’s activities have been already recorded by ISPs. The research
requires quantifying the privacy of users and the utility of their ser-
vices. We address these challenges within a novel framework, called
PBooster. This framework exploits publicly available information
in social media networks as an auxiliary source of information to
help anonymizing web browsing history while preserving utility.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows.
• We address the problem of anonymizing web browsing histories
while retaining high service utility. We show that this problem
cannot be solved in polynomial time.
• We propose an efficient framework, PBooster, with measures for
quantifying the trade-off between user privacy and the quality
of online services.
• We conduct experiments and evaluate the proposed approach in
terms of privacy and utility. Results demonstrate the efficiency
of PBooster in terms of privacy-utility trade-off.
2 RELATEDWORK
Explosive growth of the Web has not only drastically changed
the way people conduct activities and acquire information, but
also has raised security [1, 2] and privacy [4, 6, 27] issues for them.
Identifying andmitigating user privacy issues has been studied from
different aspects on the Web and social media (for a comprehensive
survey see [4]). Our work is related to a number of research which
we discuss below while highlighting the differences between our
work and them.
Tracking and Profiling. In the area of user tracking and profiling,
there have been efforts to study how and to what degree that web
browser tracking [12, 21, 26] and cross-device tracking [42] can be
done by third parties. This line of work mainly studied the mecha-
nisms of the user tracking techniques. To go one step further, for
3https://github.com/essandess/isp-data-pollution
4https://noiszy.com/
5https://github.com/FascinatedBox/RuinMyHistory
the protection of users from tracking and profiling, strategies such
as limiting the access to sampled user profiles [34] and distorting
the user profile [9] are proposed to minimize privacy risk.
Privacy Preserving Web Search.Web search has become a regu-
lar activity where a user composes a query formed by one or more
keywords and sends it to the search engine. The engine returns a
list of web pages according to the user query. These search queries
are a rich source of information for user profiling. Privacy pre-
serving web search approaches focus on anonymizing users search
queries. One group of works focused on the protection of post-hoc
logs [11, 15, 40]. Another group of approaches including client-side
ones focuses on search query obfuscation [3, 14, 17, 39]. These ap-
proaches are user-centric and automatically generate fake search
queries on behalf of user. Web browsing history anonymization
problem is different from privacy preserving web search problem.
The former consists of a set of URLs a user has visited in past brows-
ing sessions, while the latter includes a set of queries and relevant
pages returned by search engine for each given query. Moreover,
in web browsing history anonymization, URLs cannot be removed
from a user’s history (all activities have been already recorded
by ISPs) while a data publisher is allowed to remove a portion of
queries and pages in privacy preserving web search problem. This
makes the web browsing history anonymization more challenging.
Privacy Preserving Recommendation. Recommendation sys-
tems help individuals find relevant information, however, these
systems can also raise privacy concerns for users [5]. Differential
privacy based approaches [23, 25, 32] add noise to recommendation
results so that the distribution of results is insensitive to the records
of any specific user. Secure computation approaches have been also
designed to take care of the computation procedure in recommender
systems. Privacy-preserving matrix factorization schemes [18] are
designed to avoid exposure of user information during the recom-
mender’s computation. Matrix factorization has been used in many
applications such as recommendation systems and trust/distrust
prediction [7]. Another work [19] studies sharing user attributes to
recommenders while handling the trade-off between privacy and
quality of received service. Recent work [33] also studied utility-
privacy trade-off.
The problem of anonymizing web browsing history is unique
in this work. First, in our problem web browsing URLs cannot be
removed and the original format of data will be published rather
than its statistics. This also makes differential privacy based tech-
niques ineffective for this task. Second, the user is not aware of the
tasks that use his data and thus securing computation approaches
is impractical for this new problem. Third, the proposed solution
should be efficient and results in minimal loss in utility. All of these
make this problem even more challenging.
3 THREAT MODEL AND PROBLEM
STATEMENT
Before discussing the details of the proposed solution, we first
formally define browsing history, then review the web browsing
history de-anonymization and finally introduce the problem of web
browsing history anonymization. For each user, web browsing his-
tory is defined as the list of web pages a user has visited in his
past browsing sessions and includes the corresponding URLs of the
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visited web pages. This log is recorded by the browser, third-party
trackers and ISPs. In addition to his browsing history, other private
data components such as cache, cookies and saved passwords are
also saved during a browsing session which are sometimes referred
to under the browsing history umbrella. However, in this work, we
separate these pieces of information from web browsing history.
Given a user u, we assume his web browsing historyHu is gener-
ated by a sequence of n linksHu = {l1, ...ln } where li corresponds
to the i-th URL visited by the user u.
3.1 Threat Model
De-anonymizing browsing histories is a type of linkage attack
which is introduced by Su et al. [36]. This de-anonymization attack
links web browsing histories to social media profiles. The main idea
behind this threat model is that people tend to click on the links in
their social media feed. These links are mainly provided by the set
of user’s friends. Since each user has a distinctive set of friends on
social media and he is more likely to click on a link posted by any of
his friends rather than a random user, these distinctive web brows-
ing patterns remain in his browsing history. Assuming that the
attacker knows which links in the history have resulted from clicks
on social media feeds, a maximum likelihood based framework is
developed as a de-anonymization attack which identifies the feed in
the system that has more probably generated the browsing history.
This attack can be formally defined as:
Problem 1. Given user u’s web browsing historyHu = {l1, ...ln }
which is consisted of n links, map u to a social media profile whose
feed has most probably generated the browsing history [36].
Let’s assume that each user u has a personalized set of recom-
mender links. For example, this recommendation set could be a
set of links appeared in the user’s social media Feed (e.g., Twitter)
which includes links posted by the user’s friends on the network.
Su et. al. [36] assume that each user visits links in his recommenda-
tion set. Given a browsing historyHu , the attacker finds the most
likely recommendation set that corresponds to the given user u:
the recommendation set which contains many of the URLs in the
browsing history and is not too big. This de-identifies the browsing
history. For the detailed proof and implementation of this attack
please refer to [36]. Twitter is selected as a mapping platform for
evaluation of this attack. This work shows that users’ activities in
social media can be used to re-identify them. We next introduce
the problem of web browsing history anonymization.
3.2 Problem Statement
In this work, we define a privacy preserving framework which pro-
tects user’s privacy by combating the de-anonymizing web brows-
ing history threat model we discussed in Section 3.1. In addition,
utility here is also defined as user’s satisfaction of online person-
alized services. This could also be measured by comparing the
quality of manipulated web browsing history after anonymization
with the original one. Given user u’s browsing history Hu , the
goal is to anonymize u’s browsing history by adding new links to
Hu in an efficient manner, such that both the user’s privacy and
utility are preserved, i.e., web browsing history is robust against
de-identification attack and maintains its utility.
We first need to convert links to a structured dataset. One straight-
forward solution is to leverage the content of each web page and
then map it to a category or a topic selected from a predefined
set. This way, each user will be represented by a set of categories
extracted from all of the web pages he has visited. One typical way
for extracting topics is to manually define them (e.g., sports, fashion,
knowledge, etc.) and then map each web page to the corresponding
category. This method requires a set of keywords related to each
topic and then inferring the web page’s topic by calculating the
similarity of its textual content to the given keywords. This solu-
tion is not feasible in practice since it needs frequent updates of
keywords for each category due to the fast growth of the Internet.
Moreover, this only provides a coarse-grained categorization of
web pages’ contents. In order to have a finer level of granularity we
follow the same approach as in [29] and adopt Latent Dirichlet Al-
location (LDA) topic modeling technique [8]. We use the following
procedure to assign topics for each web page:
(1) We retrieve a set of web pages to construct a corpus and then
use LDA to learn topic structures from the corpus.
(2) For each web page, the learned topic model in the previous step
is used to infer the topic proportion and topic assignment based
on the textual content of the page.
(3) The topic with highest probability from the topic distribution
is selected as the representative topic of the page.
We use T = {t1, ..., tm } to denote the set of learned topics. Then
each link in the browsing historyHu is mapped to a topic in the
topic set, tl ∈ T . Matrix Tu ∈ Rn×m is then used to represent
the link-topic relationship for all the links in Hu where Tui j = 1
indicates that i-th link of user u is correlated to the topic tj . The
problem of anonymizing browsing history of useru is then formally
defined as:
Problem 2. Given user u’s browsing historyHu , and link-topic
matrix Tu , we seek to learn an anonymizer f to create a manipulated
browsing history H˜u by adding links to Hu to preserve the privacy
of user u while keeping the utility of H˜u for future applications.
f : {Hu ,Tu } → {H˜u } (1)
We stress that links cannot be removed from the browsing history
as all of user’s activities have been already recorded by ISPs.
4 A FRAMEWORK FOR PRIVACY BOOSTING
The goal of the web browsing history anonymizer is to manipulate
the user’s browsing history by adding links in a way that: 1) user
privacy is preserved even when the adversary publishes the data
with the weakest level of anonymization (i.e., just removing PIIs)
and 2) browsing history still demonstrates user’s preferences so
that the quality of personalized online services is preserved.
An immediate solution that may come to mind is to add links
from popular web sites. This approach cannot preserve privacy as
the adversary can easily remove popular links from the history and
then deploy the attack. Another solution could be adding links from
the browsing history of users who are very similar to u, i.e., his
friends in social media. This approach can preserve the utility of
browsing history but fail to make the user robust to the adversary
attack. This is also observed in [36] where it was shown that the
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more a user’s history contains links from his friends’ browsing
activities in social media, the more fingerprints he leaves behind.
All these emphasize the need for an effective solution which can
handle the utility-privacy trade-off.
In this section we will discuss how our proposed algorithm
PBooster, can handle utility-privacy trade-off. To better guide
the PBooster and to assess the quality of the altered history, we
need measures for quantifying the effect of adding links on user
privacy and utility. We first present these measures and then detail
the PBooster.
4.1 Measuring User Privacy
The best case for user privacy is when a user’s visited links (i.e.,
interests) are distributed uniformly over different topics. This im-
proves the user privacy by increasing ambiguity of his interests
distribution. This makes it harder for the adversary to infer the real
characteristic of the user’s preferences and then re-identify him by
mapping his anonymized information to a real profile. Entropy is a
metric which measures the degree of ambiguity. We leverage the
entropy of the user’s browsing history distribution over a set of
predefined topics as a measure of privacy.
We first introduce the topic-frequency vector cu ∈ Rm×1 as
⟨cu1, cu2, ..., cum⟩ for each user u, where cuj is the number of
links in u’s history related to the topic tj . Note that
∑m
j=1 cuj =
|Hu | where |.| denotes the size of a set. The topic probability
distribution for each user can be then defined as pu = J (cu ) =
⟨pu1,pu2, ...,pum⟩ where J is the normalization function of input
vector cu where puj =
cuj
|Hu | and
∑m
j=1 puj = 1. The privacy of user
u, which is the degree of ambiguity of his browsing history, can
be captured by the entropy of the topic probability distribution pu .
This measures the spread of the user’s interests across different
topics. Given topic probability distribution, privacy is measured as:
Privacy(pu ) = −
m∑
j=1
puj logpuj (2)
The higher this metric is, the greater the user privacy. The optimal
value of this measure is thus achieved when the user’s browsing
links topics are distributed uniformly across the set of topics.
4.2 Measuring Utility Loss
Utility or quality of online services is a measurement of a user’s
satisfaction from the online personalized services he receives based
on his online activities. Thismeasurement should be able to estimate
the loss of quality of services after manipulating the user’s browsing
history by the PBooster. We quantify utility loss as the difference
between a user’s topic distribution before and after browsing history
manipulation. Finding the difference between topic distributions
has been exploited in other applications such as recommender
systems [22]. We use the same notion used in [22] and quantify the
utility loss between pu and pˆu as:
utilityloss (pu , pˆu ) = 0.5 × (1 − sim(pu , pˆu )) (3)
where pˆu denotes the new topic probability after manipulating
history. One typical choice for the sim is cosine similarity [22]:
sim(pu , pˆu ) = pu .pˆu∥pu ∥.∥pˆu ∥ (4)
Since sim ∈ [−1, 1], the output of utilityloss function will be in
[0, 1]. According to this measure, the minimum value for utility loss
is when pu = pˆu and the maximum is reached when pˆu does not
have any non-zero value in common with pu .
4.3 PBooster Algorithm
We have discussed so far how to quantify a user’s utility and pri-
vacy according to his browsing history. The goal is now to find
a set of new links A to add to the browsing history such that, 1)
privacy(pˆu ) is as large as possible, and 2) utilityloss (pu , pˆu ) is as
small as possible. However, as we discussed earlier, the optimal
value for privacy is reached when the user’s interests are spread
uniformly across different topics, while the utility loss is minimized
when no changes have been done to the topic distribution pu . This
raises a trade-off issue between user’s privacy and utility loss. Sim-
ply put, maximizing privacy results in the loss of utility and vice
versa. In order to optimize the trade-off between utility loss and
privacy for each user u, we define a new scalar objective function:
G(J (cu ), J (cˆu ), λ) = λ ∗ privacy(J (cˆu )) − utilityloss (J (cu ), J (cˆu ))
(5)
where cˆu is the topic-frequency vector after manipulating browsing
history and λ controls the contribution of privacy in G. We aim to
find a set of linksA by solving the following optimization problem:
A∗ = argmax
A
G(J (cu ), J (cˆu ), λ) (6)
where cˆu could be made from H˜u = Hu ∪ A. Topic distribution
pˆu is constructed from cˆu accordingly. It’s notable to say that the
value of λ has impact on the inferred set of linksA∗ in a sense that
larger values of λ will lead to a browsing history H˜u with higher
privacy while lower λ values result in lower utility loss.
It is worthwhile to mention that the search space for this problem
(Eq.6) is exponential to N (O(m × 2N )), where N is the maximum
of the number of links w.r.t. a topic. Considering this fact, it can be
expensive and even infeasible to search for the optimal solution.
We thus decide to approach this problem in an alternative way. We
divide the optimization problem in Eq.6 into two subproblems :
(1) Topic Selection: Selecting a subset of topics and calculating
the number of links which should be added to each topic in
order to maximize the function G as follows:
a∗ = argmax
a
G(J (cu ), J (cˆu ), λ) (7)
where a = ⟨a1, ..,am⟩ ∈ Rm×1 such that each non-zero element
ai indicates the number of to-be added new links which are
related to the topic ti . Zero value means that none of the new
links are associatedwith the topic ti . Consequently, cˆu is defined
as cˆu = ⟨cu1 +a1, .., cum +am⟩. This step indicates the number
of links which should be added to each topic to maximize G.
(2) Link Selection: Selecting a proper set of links which corre-
sponds to the identified topics and their numbers found in the
previous step.
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To recap, the PBooster algorithm anonymizes a user’s browsing
history by first selecting a subset of topics with the proper number
of links for each topic (topic selection phase) and then finding
corresponding links for each of them (link selection phase). Next,
we will discuss the possible solutions for each step.
4.4 Topic Selection
One brute-force solution to the optimization problem in Eq.7, is to
evaluate all possible combinations of a set of topics with different
sizes to find the best a∗. The exponential computational complexity
of this algorithm makes it unacceptable and even impractical when
quick results are required. We thus need a more efficient solution.
According to a recent study [16], having more information in
the browsing history will not necessarily increase either the utility
or the privacy. In other words, with large information available on
user’s preferences, observing a new link would have little to no im-
pact on enhancing utility and privacy of the user. Simply put, adding
more data to the history, could make the user less secured, with no
specific improvement observed in the utility. The submodularity
concept formally captures this intuition. A real valued function f is
submodular if for a finite set E and two of its subsets X, Y where
X ⊆ Y ⊆ E, and e ∈ E\Y , the following property holds:
f (X ∪ {e}) − f (X) ≥ f (Y ∪ {e}) − f (Y) (8)
This means that adding one element {e} to the set X increases f
more than adding {e} to the setY which is superset of X [28]. This
intuitive diminishing return property exists in different areas such
as social media networks and recommender systems. Recall from
Eq. 5 that the function G is consisted of two components, namely
privacy and utility loss. Given λ ∈ [0, 1] and topic-frequency vector
cu , we can rewrite the optimization problem in Eq.7 as:
argmax
a
− λ(
∑
j
pˆuj logpˆuj ) − 0.5 × (1 −
∑
j puj pˆuj√∑
j p
2
uj
√∑
j pˆ
2
uj
)
subject to − cˆuj ≤ −cuj , cˆuj ∈ N0
(9)
where pˆuj =
cˆuj
| H˜u | is the topic probability distribution after ap-
plying PBooster. Privacy is calculated using the entropy function
which is submodular in the set of random variables [20]. The defined
utility loss is also naturally submodular [22]. Since nonnegative lin-
ear combinations of submodular functions are submodular as well,
the objective functionG is submodular.G is also non-monotone and
thus the problem in Eq.9 is equal to maximizing a non-monotone
nonnegative submodular function. This problem has been shown
to be NP-hard [13] and there is no optimal solution for it in an
efficient amount of time.
However, the problem ofmaximizing non-monotone non-negative
submodular function has been solved earlier [13]. A greedy local
search algorithm, LS, has been introduced for solving this problem
which was proved to guarantee a near-optimal solution. The greedy
LS achieved a value of at least 13 of the optimal solution [13]. For-
mally speaking, if we assume solution aG is provided by the greedy
LS algorithm, and ˆcG = cu + aG , and the optimal solution is aOPT,
and OPT(cu ) = cu + aOPT, the following theorem holds:
Theorem 4.1. If G(., .) is a nonnegative non-monotone submodu-
lar function, the set of topics aG found by the greedy algorithm has
Algorithm 1 Greedy local search for topic selection
Input: topic-frequency vector cu , λ, ϵ
Output: a = ⟨a1,a2, ...,am⟩
1: Initialize a = ⟨0, 0, ..., 0⟩, cˆu = cu + a and val ←− 0
2: while there is increase in in value of G(J (cu ), J (cˆu ), λ) do
3: Select tj , j ∈ {1, ...,m} such that by updating aj ←− aj + 1
and cˆu = cu + a, then G(J (cu ), J (cˆu ), λ) is maximazed
4: Update val ←− G(J (cu ), J (cˆu ), λ)
5: if ∃ tj such that updating aj ←− aj + 1 and cˆu = cu + a
results in G(J (cu ), J (cˆu ), λ) > (1 + ϵn2 ). val then
6: Update aj ←− aj + 1 , val ←− G(J (cu ), J (cˆu ), λ)
7: Repeat from step 5
8: end if
9: if ∃ tj such that aj ≥ 1 and updating aj ←− aj − 1 and
cˆu = cu + a results in G(J (cu ), J (cˆu ), λ) > (1 + ϵn2 ). val then
10: Update aj ←− aj − 1 , val ←− G(J (cu ), J (cˆu ), λ)
11: Repeat from step 5
12: end if
13: end while
the following lower bound [13]:
G(J (cu ), J (cˆu ), λ) ≥ (13 −
ϵ
n
)G(J (cu ), J (OPT(cu )), λ) (10)
Here, ϵ > 0 is a small number. Local search algorithm iteratively
adds an element to the final set or removes one from it to increase
the value of G until no further improvement can be achieved. Al-
gorithm 1 shows the topic selection algorithm which deploys the
greedy local search. Elements of a = ⟨a1, ..,am⟩ will be increased
or decreased iteratively to increase value of G until it cannot be
improved anymore.
We emphasize that according to [13], there is no efficient algo-
rithm which could select the best set of links to maximize aggrega-
tion of both privacy and utility in polynomial time. Following the
Theorem 4.1, the proposed greedy algorithm can select a set with a
lower bound of 13 of the optimal solution, providing the maximum
user privacy and utility in polynomial time.
4.5 Link Selection
Previously, we discussed the solution for selecting a subset of topics
and the proper number of links for each topic to preserve user
privacy while keeping the new topic distribution as close as possible
to the original one. The second step in PBooster is to select links
which correspond to the selected set of topics. Let us assume that
user u has at least one active6 account on a social media site and
PBooster has access to the list of user’s friends Fu , ∅.
We propose the following solution for the link selection problem.
For each single update ω in the vector a, we randomly select a user
v with a public social media profile from outside of the list of u’s
friends, v < Fu . We then simulate v’s browsing historyH ′v , with
the size of |H ′v | = q. The detail of this simulation is discussed in
the next section. Link-topic relation matrix Tv will be constructed
from the historyH ′v . If there is no link inH ′v which corresponds
to the topic of ω, then the process will be repeated for another
6Here, user activity does not refer to posting contents. In this work, we assume a user
as active if he visits his feed and have non-empty list of friends.
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Algorithm 2 Link selection
Input: Fu , q, a = ⟨a1,a2, ...,am⟩
Output: Set of links A
1: A = ∅
2: for each update ω in a do
3: Let tj be the corresponding topic of update ω
4: Select a user v randomly such that v < Fu
5: Simulate a browsing historyH ′v for v with the size of q.
Make cv and link-topic matrix Tu fromH ′v
6: if cv j = 0 then : Go to line 4 and repeat, else
7: Select a non-zero row r randomly from Tv [:, j]
8: Select corresponling link l to row r
9: A = A ∪ {l}
10: end if
11: end for
random user, otherwise, a random related link will be chosen. The
pseudocode of this algorithm is shown in Algorithm 2.
To recap, PBooster uses the greedy local search algorithm for
submodular maximization to first find the topics which need to be
updated and then infer the number of links which should be added
to those topics in a way that user privacy and utility is maximized.
5 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section we conduct experiments to evaluate the effectiveness
of PBooster in terms of both privacy and utility. In particular,
we seek to answer the following questions: (1) how successful is
the proposed defense in protecting users’ privacy? (2) how does
PBooster affect the quality of online services? (3) how successful
is PBooster in handling privacy-utility trade-off?
5.1 Dataset
Su et al. [36] evaluate their de-anonymization strategy by examining
it on a set of synthetically generated histories as well as real, user-
contributed web browsing histories. Synthetic history is generated
for a set of users based on their activities in social media. These users
are selected semi-randomly from social media real-time streaming
API– the more active a user is, the more likely he is to be chosen.
The histories are simulated in a way that mimic users’ real online
behaviors–they mostly click on links posted to their news feed,
and sometimes click on links posted by their friends-of-friends [36].
These friends-of-friends links may be clicked due to the organic
exploration behavior of people or the Social media’s algorithmic
recommendation system that tries to get users visit their friends-
of-friends links [35]. Their results on real user generated browsing
history is consistent with the results of synthetic histories. This
confirms the procedure of simulating synthetic browsing history
as well as the efficiency of the generated data [36].
Similar to Su et al [36], we examine the performance of PBooster
on a set of synthetically generated browsing history. We follow the
same procedure as in [36] to simulate the browsing history dataset.
To generate the synthetic history for each user u, friend’s links and
friends-of-friends’ links are generated accordingly [36]. Friends’
links are generated by pulling links from a randomly selected friend
of u. Friends-of-friends’ links are also generated by first picking
one of u’s friends, say v , uniformly at random, and then pulling a
link from one ofv’s friends. Following [36], we select Twitter as the
source of users’ activities to simulate data because of two reasons.
First, many users activities on Twitter are public, and second Twitter
has real-time API which helps avoid the need for large-scale web
crawling. We select a total number of 1200 users and following [36],
we generate histories of various sizes including {30, 50, 100} for
each user. For each history, 16% of links are from friends-of-friends
and the rest are from friends. Note that we only select links that are
related to web pages in English to make the textual analysis easier.
5.2 Experiment Setting
To simulate the real-world browsing situation, we divide the brows-
ing history into |H
u |
h batches of links with size of h. These batches
will be added to the history incrementally and PBooster will
anonymize the updated history after taking each batch. We set
the values h = 25, q = 20 (used in link selection algorithm) and
trade-off coefficient λ = {0, 0.1, 0.5, 1, 10, 20, 50, 70, 100}. We use
LDA topic modeling from Python package gensim [30] and set the
number of topicsm = 20 and LDA parameters α = 0.05, β = 0.05.
We compare PBooster with the following baselines:
• Random: Assuming x new links are added by PBooster, this
approach selects x links randomly from the browsing history of
users who are not fromu’s friends. Note that this method does not
consider the topics of the links. We compare our model against
this method to investigate whether the topics of the chosen links
will have effect on the privacy of the users, or in other words,
how well topic selection technique in Algorithm 1 performs?
• JustFriends: This approach is quite similar to PBooster except
that in the link selection phase, it adds links from a user’s friends’
simulated browsing history. We use this method to see how well
our link selection technique in Algorithm 2 performs.
• ISPPolluter7: The goal of this method is to eliminate the mutual
information between actual browsing history and the manipu-
lated one. According to [39] mutual information vanishes if:
nNoise ≥ (nCalls − 1) × nPossibleCall (11)
where nPossibleCall is the number of domains that a user might
visit per day, and nCalls is the number of visited domains. For
instance, if a user visits 100 domains and requests 200 calls per
day, then ISPPolluter adds 20,000 links randomly to the history.
We choose this method to see if eliminating mutual information
can preserve privacy in practice.
5.3 Privacy Analysis
To answer the first question, we first compare each user’s privacy
before and after anonymization for browsing histories with size
100 (|Hu | = 100). Fig. 1 depicts box plots of the distributions of
users’ privacy measured using Eq.2. The privacy-utility trade-off
coefficient λ is also fixed to λ = 10. Results demonstrate how privacy
increases after deploying PBooster in comparison to JustFriends
approach and original history. This shows that adding links from
friends cannot make significant change in privacy. This is because
of Homophily effect [24]. The Random technique leads to the most
uniform topics distribution and thus highest privacy among others.
7https://github.com/essandess/isp-data-pollution
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Figure 1: Privacy distributions before and after running
anonymization techniques.
(a) Browsing history of size 50
(b) Browsing history of size 100
Figure 2: Attack Success rate for different sizes of history.
We now evaluate the efficiency of PBooster against the de-
anonymization attack introduced in [36]. We measure the attack
success rate by the metricX% = ncN ×100where nc is the total num-
ber of users that have been successfully mapped to their Twitter
accounts, and N indicates the total number of users in the dataset.
We consider the attack as successful if the user is among the top 10
results returned by the attack. Lower values of this measure trans-
lates to the higher privacy and stronger defense. We evaluate all
methods on histories with different sizes. The results for browsing
histories with different λ are demonstrated in Fig. 2. Note due to the
lack of space, we have removed the similar trend that we observed
for |Hu | = 30. We observe the following:
• ISPPolluter does not work properly in practice and is not robust
to the attack which leverages traces of users’ activities in social
media. This confirms the idea of selecting links from non-friend
users which inhibits the adversary to find the targeted user.
(a) Browsing history of size 50
(b) Browsing history of size 100
Figure 3: Silhouette coefficient after k-means with k = 5 for
different sizes of history.
• Random is more robust to the attack than PBooster and Just-
Friends. This demonstrates that adding random links from non-
friends could perform better in terms of privacy.
• JustFriends decreases the privacy in comparison to the original
history. This aligns well with the observations of [36] suggesting
that adding links from friends can even decrease the privacy.
• Attack success rate decreases to 15% after applying PBooster.
We conclude that the generated history from PBooster is more
robust to the attacks in comparison to original history and those
generated from JustFriends and ISPPOlluter. This confirms
the effectiveness of PBooster for preserving privacy.
• PBooster performs better when |Hu | = 100. This means larger
history can help PBooster to model user’s interests better and
manipulate the history accordingly.
• PBooster is much more robust than JustFriends. This clearly
shows the efficiency of the link selection approach.
• In PBooster,the attack success rate first decreases with the in-
crease of λ and then it gets almost stable (for λ ≥ 10). This makes
the selection of λ easier and suggests that the privacy will not
increase significantly after some point, confirming that adding
more links does not always necessarily lead to more privacy.
• By deploying PBooster, the attack success rate decreases even
when λ slightly changes from 0 to 0.1, which confirms the effec-
tiveness of PBooster in anonymizing browsing histories.
To study the effect of h (size of batches of links in browsing his-
tory), we repeat the attack with different values of h for |Hu | = 100
with λ = 10 which was empirically found to work well in our
problem. Results are demonstrated in Table 1 suggesting that in-
creasingh can help to model users’ preferences more accurately and
PBooster can further decrease the traceability of users by making
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Table 1: Attack success rate after applying PBooster for dif-
ferent values of h with λ = 10.
h = 5 h = 15 h = 25 h = 50 h = 100
X 27.83 19.58 15.13 7.83 5.33
the profiles more ambiguous. Although this increases the privacy,
it increases the anonymization waiting time which could result in
sudden publishing of history without proper anonymization.
5.4 Utility Analysis
To answer the second question, we investigate the utility of the
manipulated histories to estimate the change in quality of services.
We evaluate the utility of manipulated history via a well-known
machine learning task, i.e. clustering. Prior works [31, 37] have
indicated the benefits of applying clustering in personalization
which can help to offer similar services to same cluster of people.
We use k-means to cluster users into k = 5 groups based on
their topic preferences distribution pˆu . We evaluate the utility of
browsing histories according to the quality of generated clusters
via Silhouette coefficient. Silhouette coefficient ranges from [−1, 1],
where a higher value indicates better clusters while a negative
value indicate that a sample has been assigned to the wrong cluster.
Values near zero indicate overlapping clusters (i.e., all users are
similar to each other). The results are demonstrated in Fig.3. The
same trend was observed for |Hu | = 30 but we remove it due to
space limitations. We make the following observations:
• Clusters by ISPPolluter has the lowest Silhouette coefficient
close to 0 (i.e., clusters are almost overlapping). This shows that
adding a large number of random links results in making all users
similar to each other and thus severe utility degradation.
• The quality of clusters formed by Random decreases by increas-
ing λ. This confirms that adding links randomly decreases the
utility of browsing history and thus shows the importance of the
topic and link selection phases.
• JustFriends can even increase the utility of the manipulated
browsing history. This is not surprising and the reason is that
friends havemore similar tastes to each other than random people
(Homophily effect [24]). Therefore, adding links from a friends’
history will not change the preferences distributions significantly.
Utility also improves slightly with increase in value of λ.
• Generated history by PBooster has better quality when |Hu | =
100 in comparison to |Hu | = 50. This shows that PBooster
works better when more user’s information is fed to it.
• The quality of clusters by PBooster decreases with increase in
value of λ. The change is even sensible when λ ≥ 20.
• The quality of data generated by PBooster is comparable to the
original data when λ ≤ 10. Moreover, PBooster reaches the
optimal point in privacy-utility trade-off by fixing λ = 10.
Table 2: Silhouette coefficient after applying PBooster for
different values of h with λ = 10.
h = 5 h = 15 h = 25 h = 50 h = 100
S 0.477 0.5699 0.694 0.731 0.762
Figure 4: Privacy vs utility gain for different approaches.
We repeat k-means with different values of h for |Hu | = 100
with λ = 10. Results are demonstrated in Table 2 and suggest that
increasing h will lead to more accurate representation of users and
thus improvement in the utility of data. However, as discussed ear-
lier, the main drawback with increasing value of h is increasing the
risk of sudden history publishing without proper anonymization.
5.5 Privacy-Utility Trade-off
To answer the third question, we plot the privacy and utility gain
values for each user after applying different approaches over his-
tories with size 100. We measure the privacy by Eq.2 and utility
gain as 1 − utilityloss using the Eq.3. Different colors and markers
represent different approaches. Each marker represents a user, with
measures over his manipulated history with h = 25 and λ = 10.
• The original history gains the utility of 1 and the privacy to some
extent. Random reaches the highest privacy but loses utility.
JustFriends results in higher data utility gain in comparison to
other methods but reaches a lower level of privacy. The result of
PBooster varies for different users, achieving different levels of
privacy and utility according to their original browsing behavior,
whereas all users gain similar level of privacy by Random.
• Users achieve higher privacy with PBooster than the original
data comparing with other approaches. The achieved utility by
PBooster is more than the utility by Random but less than the
utility by JustFriends. The reason lies at the intrinsic trade-off
between utility and privacy–higher privacy results in less utility.
We compare the privacy and utility of browsing history manipu-
lated by different techniques demonstrated in Fig.2 and Fig.3:
• JustFriends achieves the highest utility among all approaches
while it is the most vulnerable method. Random approach is the
most robust technique against de-anonymization attack, however
has the most utility lost. PBooster provides high privacy but
can sacrifice utility for high values of λ (λ ≥ 20).
• PBooster is the most efficient approach in terms of both privacy
and utility. Setting λ = 10, it returns the highest possible privacy
while maintaining comparable utility with the original data.
6 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
The need arises for users to protect their sensitive information
such as browsing history from potential adversaries. Some users
resort to Tor, VPN and HTTPS to remove their traces from browsing
history to assure their privacy. However, these solutions may hinder
personalized online services by degrading the utility of browsing
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history. In this study, we first quantified the trade-off between
user privacy and utility and then proposed an efficient framework
PBooster to address the problem of anonymizing web browsing
histories while retaining the utility. Our experiments demonstrate
the efficiency of the proposed model by increasing the user privacy
and preserving utility of browsing history for future applications.
In future, we would like to investigate personalized utility-privacy
trade-off, by tweaking framework parameters to fit specific needs
of each user. We also plan to replicate the work by exploring other
mechanisms for anonymizing web browsing histories. Last but not
least, we would also like to collect real-world data and investigate
the efficiency of PBooster in terms of both privacy and utility in
practice.
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